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Abstract  
Policy makers agree that vacant houses are undesirable. Moreover the existence of empty 
houses is used as an argument for allocating less land for new construction. So higher 
vacancy rates tend to trigger tighter restrictions on the supply of land. Such tighter 
restrictions lead to higher prices and, because of the incentives this creates for occupying 
housing, to lower housing vacancies (‘opportunity cost effect’). There is, however, a second 
effect ignored by planners: more restrictive planning policies impede the matching process in 
housing markets so leading to higher vacancies (‘mismatch effect’). Which of these two 
forces dominates is an empirical question. This is our focus here. Addressing potential 
reverse causation and other endogeneity concerns, we use a unique panel data set on land use 
regulation for 350 Local Authorities in England from 1981 to 2011. Our results show that 
tighter local planning constraints increase local housing vacancy rates, suggesting that the 
mismatch effect dominates. A one standard deviation increase in local regulatory 
restrictiveness causes the average local vacancy rate to increase by about 0.9 percentage 
points (23 percent). The results are economically meaningful and show that pointing to the 
existence of vacant houses as a reason for being more restrictive in allocating land for 
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1. Introduction
To an economist it might seem self-evident that vacancies in the housing stock are a natural 
feature of how any market must work. There even are ‘uneaten’ apples in a well-functioning 
fruit market. The labour market is very much more comparable to the housing market and 
virtually all mainstream economists expect to observe at least frictional unemployment when 
the labour market is in equilibrium (see Pissarides, 1985; Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994; 
Pissarides, 1994). It is the same in any normally functioning housing market. In equilibrium 
there must be vacant houses as people move and ‘house-hunt’, as people die or houses wait to 
be demolished and sellers wait to find a buyer (Han and Strange, 2015).  
But this view is often not shared by those who design buildings and influence urban policy or 
with those who plan housing supply – at least in England. Even in what was then one of the 
least restrictive English Regions, the East Midlands, in calculating how much land should be 
allocated for housing to meet their estimate of their region’s ‘housing needs’, planners argued 
that they could allocate less land because they assumed they would reduce the number of 
vacant homes: 
‘The annual average housing provision reflects a number of factors, transactional 
vacancies in new stock (about 2%) add 7,000 to the requirement, but offset against 
that is an assumption that vacancies in the existing stock should be reduced by a half 
per-cent, which will bring 8,600 dwellings back into use.’ (Government Office for the 
East Midlands, 2005, Appendix 4, p. 91). 
A logically equivalent assertion was made by the well-known architect and advocate of urban 
density, Lord Rogers, in arguing against the desirability of allowing offices to be converted to 
housing to help with London’s housing supply: ‘…why should we rush to convert office 
blocks when we already have three-quarters of a million homes in England lying empty…’ 
(Lord Rogers of Riverside, 2013).  
It is surely true that using ones stock of capital more intensively is a way of increasing 
efficiency. That is just how the cut price airlines operate: they keep their seats full and their 
aircraft in the air. They, however, had an analysis of how to reduce the time aircraft spent on 
the ground and policies to achieve it. They did not just assume planes would spend more of 
their lives in the air. Unless we understand why houses are vacant we cannot hope to reduce 
the number of vacant houses just by being more restrictive. To help improve our 
understanding of the factors which determine vacancy rates in the housing market, this paper 
investigates the causal, albeit reduced-form, impact of regulatory restrictiveness, controlling 
for other determinants of vacancy rates. 
This is important because restrictions on housing supply imposed by planning may have two 
opposing effects.1 The first of these we call the ‘opportunity cost effect’. Tighter restrictions 
on supply imply fewer available houses and therefore more demand pressure for existing 
1 Regulation may have more than two effects. We discuss one potential additional mechanism – a real options 
argument – in Section 3.5. If greater restrictiveness led to greater price volatility then under certain assumptions 
this might induce owners to postpone renting or selling their properties, implying a higher vacancy rate 
(Grenadier, 1995 and 1996). Empirically, however, we can find no evidence that such a mechanism plays a 
significant part in explaining what we find. 
1 
 homes, increasing house prices and thus the opportunity cost of keeping housing empty. This 
will lead to a lower vacancy rate all else equal (Wheaton, 1990). If this ‘opportunity cost 
effect’ was the only effect at work, tighter supply constraints should unambiguously lower 
vacancy rates. 
There is however a second effect, which we refer to as the ‘mismatch effect’. Tighter supply 
constraints not only reduce supply of new houses but also influence the composition and 
adaptability of the bundle of attributes of both the housing stock and new build. Over time the 
structure of households’ demand for housing attributes changes because incomes rise, the 
demographic structure of the population changes and preferences themselves may change. 
For example, as real incomes rise so does the demand for certain attributes depending on the 
varying income elasticity of demand for them.2 In addition there may be demographic 
changes such as an increase in the proportion of single adults, which mean that market 
preferences change.  
If the attributes of the housing stock, as a consequence of planning constraints, cannot, or can 
only more slowly adjust to these changes on the demand side, matching the demand for 
housing attributes with the supply of those available will inevitably become more difficult. 
Hence, in line with Wheaton (1990), mismatched households may have to reside longer in a 
less restrictive housing market, while searching in a more restrictive market, implying a 
relatively lower vacancy rate in the less restrictive market and a higher vacancy rate in the 
more restrictive one. Mismatched households may also have to search further afield for a 
suitable home; they become mismatched on the locational characteristics of houses implying 
longer commutes.  
Our aim in this paper is to determine the net effect of these two opposing forces – the 
opportunity cost effect vs. the mismatch effect – in order to identify the role that regulatory 
restrictiveness plays in determining the vacancy rate in local housing markets. To do so, we 
analyse panel data on housing vacancies for 350 Local Authorities (LA) in England from 
1981 to 2011. One key concern in this analysis is the endogeneity of local planning 
restrictiveness. The stylised fact that policy makers and local planners may respond to higher 
vacancy rates by restricting supply suggests possible reverse causation. Regulatory 
constraints may also be endogenous to unobserved demand factors (Hilber and Robert-
Nicoud, 2013; Davidoff, 2014) and those demand factors may directly affect vacancy rates. 
To account for possible reverse causation and omitted variable bias and thus identify the 
causal effect of regulatory restrictiveness, we employ an instrumental variables strategy by 
exploiting a specific feature of the British voting system; the substantial ‘randomness’ of 
seats won (or lost) beyond the vote share – the outcome of the ‘first past the post’ system. 
That is, we use the share of Labour seats in LAs (which implement planning policies in 
England), controlling for the share of Labour votes in a flexible way, as an instrumental 
variable to identify local planning refusal rates.  
Our empirical findings are as follows. First, when we naively look at cross-sectional data, we 
find a negative relationship between more restrictive local planning and local vacancy rates. 
2 The income elasticity of demand for space both inside houses and in gardens seems to be particularly strong: 
Cheshire and Sheppard (1998) estimate an elasticity of close to two. 
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 That is, the relationship superficially appears to confirm the planners’ assumptions. However, 
if we (i) use first differencing and so control for time-invariant unobservable characteristics, 
(ii) properly account for the endogeneity of restrictiveness by instrumenting for it and (iii) 
control for other relevant factors, more restrictive places have a significantly – and 
substantially – higher housing vacancy rate. That is the underlying causal relationship 
appears to be exactly the opposite to that which planners assume. Based on our most rigorous 
empirical specification, a one standard deviation increase in local regulatory restrictiveness 
causes the average local vacancy rate to increase by about 0.9 percentage points (23 percent). 
Our findings, therefore, strongly suggest that tighter local planning restrictiveness not only 
leads to less efficient housing market matching but this effect dominates the opportunity cost 
effect, resulting in higher vacancy rates overall. Hence, efforts to reduce the number of 
vacant homes by imposing supply restrictions have the paradoxical effect of increasing the 
vacancy rate while at the same time making housing less affordable. We also provide more 
direct evidence that regulatory restrictiveness leads to more mismatch, as we show that 
commuting distances from the workplace are larger in more restrictive local authorities, 
suggesting that households had to search further afield to find a home that matched their 
preferences; so were locationally mismatched. 
We proceed as follows. In the next section we discuss the relationship between land use 
regulation, housing market search and matching and the resulting vacancy rate in more depth. 
We then describe our data and set out our main results. The final section draws conclusions. 
 
2. Land use regulation, housing market search and vacant housing 
The price of housing services is a function of both demand and supply in the relevant local 
markets. Various empirical studies document a positive effect of regulatory restrictiveness on 
house prices (Cheshire and Sheppard, 2002; Glaeser and Gyourko, 2003; Glaeser et al., 
2005a; b; Quigley and Raphael, 2005; Ihlanfeldt, 2007; Hilber and Vermeulen, forthcoming).  
What these studies do not consider is the fact that, on the seller’s side, it takes time to sell a 
house and, on the buyer’s side, search for a new house is costly too. These search frictions 
lead to housing vacancies (Merlo and Ortalo-Magné, 2004; Han and Strange, 2015). It has 
been documented – and our data also suggests – that housing vacancies are not constant 
across space and time and depend on preferences of households living in a housing market, as 
well as on characteristics of the location (Rosen and Smith, 1983; Gabriel and Nothaft, 2001). 
However, the impact of land use restrictions on housing vacancies has not yet been studied. 
In the context of this paper we use data on local jurisdictions – in Britain, Local (Planning) 
Authorities (LAs) – which we refer to as local housing markets.3 Households often search in 
a local housing market while still living in another local market, for example due to changes 
in where they work (Wheaton 1990; Koster and Van Ommeren, 2015). Within any LA, the 
supply of housing units is the outcome of construction companies’ building costs (including 
3 It might be argued that Travel to Work Areas (TTWA) approximate more closely to spatial housing markets 
but neither vacancies, planning decisions nor voting data are available in reliable form for TTWAs and planning 
policy is implemented by the LA. TTWAs do not correspond to any political jurisdiction. 
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 the cost of land) relative to expected future prices; the existing stock of houses and the degree 
of regulatory restrictiveness exercised by the LA. The supply of characteristics of housing is 
the result of both the characteristics of new build housing and the adaptation of the existing 
stock. 
The regulatory restrictiveness influences the rate and characteristics of new construction and 
the flexibility of the existing stock since both new construction and significant changes to the 
characteristics of existing houses typically require ‘development control’ permission. That is, 
all proposals which fall within the legal definition of ‘development’, such as any change of 
legally defined ‘use category’, a qualifying addition of living space or a garage or building a 
new house or flat, have to be submitted to the LA for decision. This is the responsibility of 
the LA’s Planning Committee made up of locally elected politicians. This decision making 
process tends to be politicised and unlike a Zoning or Master Planning system, such as in 
force in the US or in most of Continental Europe, decisions are not very predictable.  
The degree of restrictiveness also influences the composition and adaptability of the bundle 
of attributes of existing housing available to meet the changing preferences of those seeking 
houses. This is because the more restrictive a LA is, the more difficult it will be to change the 
characteristics of a given house and the less flexibility will there be on the characteristics – 
including location – of new build houses: for example someone searching for a house with a 
good local school may require more bedroom space but it will be more difficult to obtain 
permission to convert attics into living space in more restrictive LAs. Equally, developers 
may have greater difficulty expanding the supply of family housing near better schools. In 
other words, all else equal, in more restrictive markets both the supply of new houses and the 
characteristics of the existing stock will be less well adapted to the structure of demand for 
housing characteristics.  
As noted in the introduction, planning induced housing supply restrictions will have two 
opposing effects on the rate of the vacant housing stock: an ‘opportunity cost effect’ and a 
‘mismatch effect’. The opportunity cost effect works via restrictions of supply reducing the 
availability of land for development (see for example Cheshire and Sheppard, 2005, or Hilber 
and Vermeulen, forthcoming). This reduces the rate of new building and so over time the size 
of the stock of housing relative to demand within the market. This, all else equal, increases 
prices and thus the opportunity cost of keeping housing vacant. The effect of this is 
unambiguously to reduce vacancy rates. It will also be likely to increase price volatility. 
However, more restrictive planning policies will also change the bundle of attributes on offer 
and, other things equal, slow the rate of adaptation of housing characteristics to changes in 
the structure of demand with respect to them – the mismatch effect. This will come about via 
two separate forces, one working on the characteristics of new build and the other on the 
adaptation of the characteristics of the existing stock of houses.  
The first force may imply that new build houses become smaller, more distant from jobs, 
relatively more concentrated and are more likely to be in the form of flats or terraced houses, 
because there is less land available for dwellings. The second force arises because the 
structure of demand for housing characteristics changes over time and to accommodate this, 
the characteristics of the existing stock of housing needs to be constantly adjusted. For 
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 example, as entry to the best state schools in Britain has become more determined by the 
exact location of houses and the relative standing of different schools has changed, so people 
seeking to ‘buy’ entry to better state schools will want more bedroom space in the best 
schools’ catchment areas. Another example is that as more cars have been bought (car 
ownership has increased 13-fold since the current form of land use planning in England was 
introduced in 1947 and doubled since our vacancy data starts in 1981, Department for 
Transport, 2013), the demand for garages and off street parking has increased. Such examples 
of ways in which the demand for housing attributes changes over time could be increased 
almost indefinitely.4 However, what it means is that if the supply and demand for the 
structural characteristics of housing are to be efficiently matched to each other, there will 
need to be constant adaptation of the characteristics of the existing stock of houses. So LAs 
that are more restrictive in their application of development control will slow the adaptation 
of the existing stock to (changes in) the structure of demand for housing attributes. 
Over time, in more restrictive LAs the characteristics of new and existing housing available 
will be less adapted to preferences of households. Hence, other things equal, if people have a 
strong idiosyncratic preference for locations and house type (e.g. a double-earner household 
with children that needs at least two-bedrooms), they will spend more time searching for 
housing that matches their preferences. When households live in a less restrictive housing 
market while searching in the more restrictive local market, this will imply a decrease in the 
vacancy rate in the former and an increase in the latter housing market, ceteris paribus.5 In 
other words, given idiosyncratic preferences, households stay longer in the ‘wrong’ places. 
Households may also be induced to decrease the real costs of their search by living in 
suboptimal temporary accommodation such as caravans, mobile homes or their parents’ spare 
rooms. This allows them to spend longer searching and to search more efficiently being on 
the spot but does not necessarily cause higher vacancies: it is rather an adaptive response to 
less affordable housing matching their preferences. 
Directly testing whether the mismatch between preferences of households and the local 
housing stock on offer is more pronounced in more restricted local housing markets is subject 
to significant problems. We discuss one possible measure in Section 3.5: commuting 
distances from the workplace in the LA. We do indeed find that commuting distances 
increase with LA restrictiveness. This result is consistent with house hunters finding it more 
difficult to match their preferences in more restrictive local housing markets so becoming 
‘mismatched’ locationally.6  
4 Other examples might be homes adapted for disabled people, or two-bedroom family homes. The relatively 
more scarce such houses with specific desirable characteristics are then the longer households will have to spend 
searching for their ideal house 
5 In Web Appendix 1 we present a simple formal model in the spirit of Wheaton (1990) that illustrates this point. 
Using numerical simulations, we formally demonstrate that an increase in the (relative) regulatory 
restrictiveness in a particular market may increase the local vacancy rate in that market depending on parameter 
values. 
6 In Appendix 2 we use another proxy for mismatch – the share of households in non-permanent homes – and 
provide some evidence that restrictiveness leads to a higher share of non-permanent homes. The results are not 
particularly statistically strong. This is likely because this alternative measure is very noisy and as much a 
response to improve search efficiency as a proxy for mismatch. 
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 The well-documented fact that tighter local regulation leads to higher prices is indicative that 
the opportunity cost effect may be important in determining local vacancy rates. However, 
we lack evidence on the importance of the offsetting mismatch effect. Thus the net effect of 
local regulatory restrictiveness on local vacancy rates is ambiguous. The empirical analysis 
that follows aims to identify this net effect while eliminating alternative explanations.  
 
3. Empirical Analysis 
3.1 Data and descriptive statistics 
Our data come from several sources. The vacancy rates are from the UK Census for the years 
1981, 1991, 2001 and 2011. For the first three Census years we have information on the 
number of vacant dwellings and we are able to distinguish between primary dwellings and 
second homes.7 For 2011 the Census reported only information on the number of all 
unoccupied dwellings including second homes. Hence we use information on the number of 
second homes in 2001 and assume that the share of second homes remained constant between 
2001 and 2011 to estimate the number of vacant dwellings for 2011. In a sensitivity check we 
use an alternative dataset for vacancy rates (available for 2001 and 2011 only) to test whether 
our findings are sensitive to this adjustment. The latter dataset is provided by the Department 
of Communities and Local Government (DCLG). The primary source is the Local Authority 
(LA) returns for the Council Tax.8 
We obtain our measures of regulatory restrictiveness from the Planning Statistics group at the 
DCLG. Following the literature, our key measure is the refusal rate for major residential 
projects available for each LA on an annual basis. The refusal rate for ‘major’ projects is 
defined as the share of applications for residential developments of ten or more dwellings that 
is refused by a LA in any year during the process of ‘development control’. We calculate the 
refusal rate for each LA using data on all applications and refused applications for the Census 
year itself plus the two years preceding it.9 
As a proxy for local (housing) demand we use LA-level male weekly earnings for the period 
from 1981 to 2011, following Hilber and Vermeulen (forthcoming). Our earnings data come 
from the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) for the period from 1997 to 2011 and 
from the New Earnings Survey (NES) for the period from 1981 to 1996. We obtained the 
ASHE data at the LA-level but the NES data for earlier years are only available at the county 
and London borough level. We then geographically matched all earnings data to the LA-level 
and deflated the nominal earnings figures by the Retail Price Index to obtain real earnings. 
7 The Census uses the term ‘household space’, which is a space taken by one household, including that of just 
one person. Almost no household shares facilities like bathrooms (less than 0.1 percent), implying that the 
number of (vacant) household spaces is essentially the same as the number of (vacant) dwellings. Hence, in 
what follows, we will refer to dwellings as household spaces. 
8 The cross-sectional correlation between the 2001 Census and the DCLG data is 0.68, indicating that there are 
non-trivial differences in the measurement of vacant dwellings arising from the different methodologies. As is 
discussed later, our key findings are very similar when we use this alternative measure for vacancy rates. 
9 In a web appendix we also use additional information on the refusal rate of minor projects and show that our 
results are robust when we include this additional information. 
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 For more details on the data and procedures used, we refer to Hilber and Vermeulen 
(forthcoming).  
A number of other factors may influence vacancy rates, in particular housing tenure, 
demographics and socio economic characteristics. We obtain these control variables from the 
Population Censuses. Our list of controls includes the local homeownership rate. 
Homeowners tend to move less often than renters, and this is likely to be reflected in higher 
vacancy rates for rental housing. We also control for the share of council housing. Because 
rents of council houses are usually below market value, there are waiting lists for council 
houses. This is likely to imply a shorter duration of vacancies (Pawson and Kintrea, 2002). 
However, this effect could be offset if councils have less efficient housing management. 
The Population Censuses also provide data on the share of people between 30 and 64 and the 
share of elderly, 65 and over. Young people may be more flexible in their housing choices 
than older people, and they may be less selective because they are more income constrained 
or have lower search costs (perhaps because of lower opportunity costs of time) leading to 
lower vacancy rates in LAs where there are proportionately more young adults. On the other 
hand, younger people tend to have a higher mobility rate, leading to higher vacancy rates. 
The mortality rate is of course highly correlated to the share of elderly. Death frequently 
implies that houses become vacant and, moreover, because of probate and perhaps other 
reasons (the new owner may not be a local resident or the house has suffered a period of 
neglect so is more likely to need refurbishment) houses that become vacant on the death of 
their owner are likely to remain vacant for longer. Other control variables derived from the 
Population Censuses are the share unemployed, the share of highly educated, and the share of 
residents with permanent illnesses. 
Our instrumental variable strategy employs information on the political composition of the 
local council and local vote shares. We obtained the local election data from various sources: 
(i) the British Local Election Database (1889-2003) compiled by Rallings and Thrasher 
(2004), (ii) the Local Election Handbooks (1999 to 2008), (iii) the Local Elections Archive 
Project (LEAP) (2006 to 2010) and (iv) the BBC (2009 to 2011). We do not have data on 
local elections for four local authorities, so these are excluded from the analysis, leaving us 
with a regression sample of 350 LAs and 4 Census years (1981, 1991, 2001 and 2011).10  
 Since it might be argued that turnout is unrepresentatively low at local elections in the 
sensitivity analysis, we also use data on general elections, by matching each Census year to 
the nearest general election year (i.e., 1983, 1992, 2001 and 2010). The LA-level share of 
votes for the Labour party in the general elections is derived from the British Election Studies 
Information System. For more information on the election data, we refer to the Data 
Appendix. 
10 Since in our empirical analysis we first difference the Census data to account for time-invariant unobservable 
characteristics, we end up with 350 × (4 − 1) = 1050 observations. We note that some LAs have been 
amalgamated in 2011, reducing the total number of LAs to 326. To achieve consistency in our analysis over 
time we geographically match the 2011 LA information to 2001 LA boundaries with the help of official ‘lookup 
tables’. In a robustness check we exclude those LAs that were affected by amalgamation. Results are very 
similar. 
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 We also gather data on house prices from the Land Registry (1995-2011) and the Council of 
Mortgage Lenders (CML) (1974-1995). We do so by taking account of the composition of 
sales in terms of housing types by adopting a mix-adjustment approach (see Wall, 1998). The 
real price index is obtained by again deflating the nominal series with the Retail Price Index. 
We then use the price index to create a measure of local price volatility; again for more 
information see Hilber and Vermeulen (forthcoming). Table 1 presents the descriptive 
statistics. It can be seen that the average overall vacancy rate is about 4 percent. The vacancy 
rate in 2011 was 3.6 percent. This is only slightly lower than in the United States, where it 
was 4.5 percent in 2012.11 This might seem surprising when one takes into account the 
enormous excess supply of housing in the wake of the Great Recession that made housing 
extremely affordable in the US. A striking feature of vacancy rates in England is that the 
average vacancy rate is quite stable over time (Figure 1). In Figure 2 we plot the cross-
sectional relationship between the vacancy rate and house prices. Vacancy rates are 
somewhat lower in areas with high prices (ρ= –0.246), consistent with the opportunity cost 
argument discussed above. There is little response to the housing market cycle; the 
correlation between the change in the vacancy rate and the change in house prices is very low 
with ρ= –0.069.  
We map the average local vacancy rates over the sample period in Figure 3. There is 
meaningful variation in vacancy rates over space. Vacancy rates are generally higher in the 
less prosperous north. Cities like Liverpool and Bradford, which respectively relied on 
traditional port and port-related manufacturing or textiles, experienced decline from the 
1950s. Apart from high unemployment and lower earnings there was outward migration 
tending to generate a more obsolete housing stock and higher housing vacancy rates. Also in 
areas where mining was historically important (in County Durham and Lancashire for 
example), vacancy rates tend to be higher. We implicitly control for these geographical 
differences in the industry composition by first differencing our empirical specification, thus 
capturing all time-invariant characteristics that vary over space. The inclusion of the first 
difference in local unemployment rate as a further control should effectively control for any 
relevant influence of changes in industrial structure on housing vacancy rates.  
Refusal rates over the last 30 years have been clearly highest in the Greater London Area and 
in the south of England and lowest in the north of the country (Figure 4). The south of 
England has not only been economically considerably more successful than northern regions 
over the period, but it has (perhaps relatedly) had much tighter planning restrictiveness. This 
– despite strong housing demand – has constrained the growth of housing supply in southern 
England relative to the north. 
3.2 Econometric framework and identification 
We aim to test the impact of housing supply restrictions (as captured by the refusal rates of 
major projects) on vacancy rates. Let 𝑣𝑣ℓ,𝑡𝑡 be the vacancy rate in LA ℓ in year 𝑡𝑡. 𝑟𝑟ℓ,𝑡𝑡−2 is the 
refusal rate, where the refusal rate is calculated using all applications and refused applications 
11 Owner-occupied housing has a vacancy rate of 2.2 percent and rental housing about 8.8 percent. As the share 
of owner-occupied housing in the United States is about 0.65, the overall vacancy rate is 4.5 percent. 
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 in years 𝑡𝑡 − 2, 𝑡𝑡 − 1 and 𝑡𝑡. We use data up to two years before and including the year of 
observation to avoid random yearly fluctuations and the fact that some local authorities 
receive no or very few applications in a particular year. 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 are year fixed effects that capture 
any aggregate economic shocks and also any policy changes at the national level that might 
affect vacancy rates. Then: 
(1) 𝑣𝑣ℓ,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑟𝑟ℓ,𝑡𝑡−2 + 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖ℓ,𝑡𝑡 , 
where 𝛼𝛼 is the parameter of interest and 𝜖𝜖ℓ,𝑡𝑡 is an independently and identically distributed 
error term. Policy makers expect that 𝛼𝛼 < 0, implying that supply restrictions lead to a lower 
vacancy rate. The problem with estimating this specification using OLS is that there are 
potentially important endogeneity concerns with respect to 𝑟𝑟ℓ,𝑡𝑡. First, there may be several 
omitted variables that have a joint impact on regulation and vacancy rates. For example, areas 
with more demand (higher earnings) are argued to have lower vacancy rates and more 
stringent planning (Hilber and Robert-Nicoud, 2013). Another concern is that due to durable 
housing, the north of England with its declining industries can be expected to have higher 
vacancy rates. It is also observed that these areas are less restrictive, so there may be spurious 
correlation. This may lead to a (strong) downward bias of the coefficient 𝛼𝛼. A second source 
of bias is that if developers know that a particular LA is more restrictive and so more likely to 
reject applications, they will be less likely to apply in the first place because applications cost 
significant resources. This implies a measurement error in the regulatory restrictiveness 
measure. A third concern is that vacancy rates also influence regulatory restrictiveness 
(reverse causality). When policy makers observe a high vacancy rate, they may become more 
reluctant to permit new development. 
To partially address the first source of endogeneity, we estimate a first-difference equation, 
so that we can control for all time-invariant unobserved factors. Hence: 
(2) Δ𝑣𝑣ℓ,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼Δ𝑟𝑟ℓ,𝑡𝑡−2 + 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 + Δ𝜖𝜖ℓ,𝑡𝑡 , 
where Δ denotes the change.12 
This specification only partly addresses the first endogeneity concern because there might 
still be correlation with unobserved shocks. For example, in locations with increasing 
demand, house prices and regulatory restrictiveness may increase simultaneously. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that in England regulatory restrictiveness is strongly pro-cyclical. In times 
of high demand, planners reject more proposals in attractive areas, perhaps to avoid ’what 
they perceive as a threatened ‘oversupply’ and perhaps because the system cannot cope with 
the workload. Because housing supply takes time to adjust, this will lead to lower local 
vacancy rates during boom periods. This again implies that 𝛼𝛼 is likely strongly downward 
biased if we estimate (2) by OLS.  
We therefore have to find an instrumental variable to identify refusal rates that is uncorrelated 
with local unobserved shocks. In a same spirit to Bertrand and Kramarz (2002) we use the 
political make-up of local councils to construct an instrument for the refusal rate. 
12 One might also use a fixed effects approach. We test the robustness of the results using a fixed effects 
approach in Web Appendix 2 and show that results are very similar. 
 9 
                                                 
 Specifically, our instrument is the change in the number of seats for the Labour party between 
election years close to the Census years. Traditionally Labour voters and politicians have 
been less opposed to new residential construction than their Conservative counterparts. 
Labour councillors typically represent a part of the population that has less housing equity 
and so is less subject to NIMBY pressures aiming to protect house values. Labour councillors 
are also likely to be more interested in the job generating effects of construction. Thus, we 
can expect that an increase in the share of Labour seats may induce LAs to become less 
restrictive, yet, a change in the share of Labour seats should not directly affect the local 
vacancy rate other than through any effects it has on planning restrictiveness. So we estimate: 
(3) Δ𝑣𝑣ℓ,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝚫𝚫𝒓𝒓𝓵𝓵,𝒕𝒕−𝟐𝟐 + 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 + Δ𝜖𝜖ℓ,𝑡𝑡, 
(3.1) 𝚫𝚫𝒓𝒓𝓵𝓵,𝒕𝒕−𝟐𝟐 = 𝛼𝛼�Δ𝑠𝑠ℓ,𝑡𝑡−2 + 𝜃𝜃�𝑡𝑡 + Δ𝜖𝜖ℓ̃,𝑡𝑡, 
where bold indicates that changes in the regulatory constraints measure Δ𝑟𝑟ℓ,𝑡𝑡−2 are 
instrumented by changes in the share Labour seats Δ𝑠𝑠ℓ𝑡𝑡 and the ~ refers to first stage 
parameters. 
One might still be concerned that our instruments are correlated with Δ𝜖𝜖ℓ,𝑡𝑡, so the next step is 
to include local authority area fixed effects 𝜂𝜂ℓ: 
(4) Δ𝑣𝑣ℓ,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝚫𝚫𝒓𝒓𝓵𝓵,𝒕𝒕−𝟐𝟐 + 𝜂𝜂ℓ + 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 + Δ𝜖𝜖ℓ,𝑡𝑡, 
(4.1) 𝚫𝚫𝒓𝒓𝓵𝓵,𝒕𝒕−𝟐𝟐 = 𝛼𝛼�Δ𝑠𝑠ℓ,𝑡𝑡−2 + 𝜂𝜂�ℓ + 𝜃𝜃�𝑡𝑡 + Δ𝜖𝜖ℓ̃,𝑡𝑡. 
By including local authority area fixed effects 𝜂𝜂ℓ, we control for all linear trends caused by 
unobservable factors, which increases the likelihood that changes in the instruments are 
uncorrelated with Δ𝜖𝜖ℓ,𝑡𝑡. 
If the instruments are valid (so uncorrelated with omitted variables and therefore the error 
term), adding additional control variables, should not influence the parameter of interest 𝛼𝛼, 
but also should not have an impact on the first-stage coefficients of the instrument. To test 
this, we include other, potentially endogenous, control variables, like changes in the 
demographic composition: 
(5) Δ𝑣𝑣ℓ,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝚫𝚫𝒓𝒓𝓵𝓵,𝒕𝒕−𝟐𝟐 + 𝛽𝛽∆𝑥𝑥ℓ,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜂𝜂ℓ + 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 + Δ𝜖𝜖ℓ,𝑡𝑡, 
(5.1) 𝚫𝚫𝒓𝒓𝓵𝓵,𝒕𝒕−𝟐𝟐 = 𝛼𝛼�Δ𝑠𝑠ℓ,𝑡𝑡−2 + 𝛽𝛽�∆𝑥𝑥ℓ,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜂𝜂�ℓ + 𝜃𝜃�𝑡𝑡 + Δ𝜖𝜖ℓ̃,𝑡𝑡, 
where ∆𝑥𝑥ℓ,𝑡𝑡 is a vector of changes in the control variables. One of our control variables is the 
change in log local average earnings as a proxy for local demand. One might be particularly 
concerned about the endogeneity of earnings and we are also interested in the impact of this 
variable on local vacancy rates. Thus, in a robustness check, following Hilber and Vermeulen 
(forthcoming), we instrument for this variable using a measure that captures local demand 
shocks. We do not include local house prices as a control since, as we discuss in Section 2, 
we would expect that regulatory restrictiveness influences vacancy rates in part through 
house prices. Moreover, house prices and vacancy rates are jointly determined by restrictions. 
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 The main objection to the validity of the change in the share Labour seats-instrument is that it 
may be correlated with (potentially non-linear) unobserved trends. For example, some 
neighbourhoods in London have experienced a substantial inflow of wealthy residents during 
the last two decades, leading to changes in the demographic composition of the 
neighbourhood and therefore also to changes in voting behaviour. We thus control for a 
flexible function of local vote shares of the previous local election, identifying regulatory 
restrictiveness from the random component generated by the particular feature of the British 
‘first past the post’ voting system: seats allocated to parties are very seldom proportional to 
the number of votes. For example the Labour party may only receive 35 percent of the votes 
but since other parties also win significant vote shares, in addition to the Conservative party, 
Labour may still end up with a majority of seats. So what we use to identify regulatory 
restrictiveness is the number of seats that Labour won (or lost) beyond their vote share. While 
Labour’s local vote share may be correlated with various demographic and socio-economic 
characteristics of the constituency, holding local vote shares constant, seats won (or lost) 
above and beyond should be uncorrelated with the error term. We can express our final 
estimating (base) equation as: 
(6) Δ𝑣𝑣ℓ,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝚫𝚫𝒓𝒓𝓵𝓵,𝒕𝒕−𝟐𝟐 + 𝛽𝛽∆𝑥𝑥ℓ,𝑡𝑡 + Ω�Δ𝜋𝜋ℓ,𝑡𝑡� + 𝜂𝜂ℓ + 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 + Δ𝜖𝜖ℓ,𝑡𝑡, 
(6.1) 𝚫𝚫𝒓𝒓𝓵𝓵,𝒕𝒕−𝟐𝟐 = 𝛼𝛼�Δ𝑠𝑠ℓ,𝑡𝑡−2 + 𝛽𝛽�∆𝑥𝑥ℓ,𝑡𝑡 + Ω��Δ𝜋𝜋ℓ,𝑡𝑡� + 𝜂𝜂�ℓ + 𝜃𝜃�𝑡𝑡 + Δ𝜖𝜖ℓ̃,𝑡𝑡,, 
where 𝜋𝜋ℓ,𝑡𝑡 is the share of Labour voters in the closest previous local elections, and 
(6.2) Ω�Δ𝜋𝜋ℓ,𝑡𝑡� = �𝛾𝛾𝑛𝑛Δ�𝜋𝜋ℓ,𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛 �𝑁𝑁
𝑛𝑛=1
     and       Ω��Δ𝜋𝜋ℓ,𝑡𝑡� = �𝛾𝛾�𝑛𝑛Δ�𝜋𝜋ℓ,𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛 �𝑁𝑁
𝑛𝑛=1
.  
Hence, Ω( ∙ ) and Ω�( ∙ ) are 𝑁𝑁th order polynomials of local vote shares 𝜋𝜋ℓ,𝑡𝑡 and 𝛾𝛾𝑛𝑛 and 𝛾𝛾�𝑛𝑛 are 
parameters to be estimated. 
3.3 Baseline results  
We start by ignoring any potential endogeneity issues and simply regress the vacancy rate on 
the refusal rate of major residential projects (equation 1). In Figure 5 we plot the cross-
sectional relationship between the major refusal rate and the vacancy rate. We can see that 
refusal rates are negatively related to vacancy rates. The regression line implies that a one 
standard deviation increase in refusal rates is associated with a 0.23 percentage point decrease 
in the vacancy rate (s.e. 0.040). This naïve correlation provides ‘common sense’ evidence 
supporting the view that vacant houses can be ‘regulated away’. However, the quantitative 
impact is not very large.  
Table 2 reports estimates for equations (2) to (6). In the cases of equations (3) to (6) these are 
the second stage results of our IV-estimates. In column (1) we regress the change in the 
vacancy rate on the change in the refusal rate still ignoring potential endogeneity issues 
(equation 2). We first difference controls to offset for any time invariant omitted 
characteristics such as differences in income levels across local authorities. We see that even 
without instrumenting for the refusal rate or adding control variables, the relationship 
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 between (the changes in) the planning restrictiveness and (the changes in) the vacancy rate is 
no longer negative and statistically significant.  
However, because of the endogeneity concerns discussed, the coefficient on the refusal rate 
cannot be interpreted as a causal effect. As a first step to addressing this issue we include 
local authority fixed effects in column (2). The coefficient on the change in major refusal rate 
now becomes positive and statistically significant at the 10 percent level. In column (3) of 
Table 2 we add further control variables as discussed in Section 3.1 above. The estimated 
coefficient for the change in the major refusal rate is hardly affected, although it is not 
statistically significant at conventional levels anymore. The control variables often have a 
statistically significant impact on the change in the vacancy rate with the anticipated sign. For 
example, areas with an increasing share of elderly people or of council housing experience an 
increase in the vacancy rate. Also, areas with an increasing unemployment rate, from which 
people may have been tending to move away, experience an increase in the vacancy rate. In 
areas with a rising share of highly educated people, vacancies tend to decrease.  
Still, however, regulatory restrictiveness is likely measured with error (because developers 
may not apply in the first place in more restrictive places). It may also be correlated with 
unobserved shocks. Moreover, we should address the potential reverse causality issue that 
higher vacancy rates may induce policy makers to be more restrictive. We therefore 
instrument for the change in the major refusal rate with the change in the share Labour seats 
in column (4). This specification corresponds to equation (3) above. 
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistics indicate that weak identification of regulatory restrictiveness is 
not an issue. The results suggest that a standard deviation increase in the major refusal rate 
leads to an increase in the vacancy rate of 0.82 percentage points. As noted in the previous 
subsection, one objection to the instrument is that it may be correlated with unobserved 
characteristics of the area. To control for this, we include LA fixed effects in column (5) – 
corresponding to equation (4). The coefficient on the refusal rate is hardly changed and 
remains statistically significant at the five percent level. Column (6), corresponding to 
equation (5), includes the same range of control variables as in column (3). This makes 
almost no difference to the estimated coefficient of primary interest. 
One might still be worried that changes in the share of Labour seats are correlated with 
unobservable shocks (e.g. gentrification) that simultaneously have an impact on voting 
behaviour and vacancy rates. So in column (7) we estimate our final model (6). That is, we 
additionally include a flexible function of changes in the Labour votes in local elections, 
approximated by a fifth-order polynomial to isolate the impact of voting behaviour caused by 
the demographic and socio-economic composition of the LA from political power (measured 
by seats). In the sensitivity checks, discussed below, we report results for different orders of 
polynomials. Reassuringly, the estimated effect of regulatory restrictiveness in column (7) is 
very similar to the previous specifications. The instrument is somewhat less strong (with a 
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic of 8.2). Still, we find a positive and economically meaningful 
effect of regulatory restrictiveness on the vacancy rate: a one standard deviation increase in 
the major refusal rate increases the vacancy rate by 0.90 percentage points. Due to the 
correlation between changes in the Labour vote shares and changes in the share of Labour 
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 seats, it is no surprise that the coefficient is now only statistically significant at the 10 percent 
level.13 
In Table 3 we report the corresponding first-stage estimates: a standard deviation increase in 
the share of Labour seats leads to a decrease in the major refusal rate of 0.26-0.34 standard 
deviations. It is notable that the first-stage coefficients of the change in the share Labour seats 
instrument are highly statistically significant and are hardly affected by the inclusion of local 
authority fixed effects and other control variables. If we include vote share controls, the 
coefficient on change in Labour seats becomes slightly lower, but it is still statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level. 
3.4 Sensitivity analysis 
In this subsection, we conduct an extensive set of sensitivity analyses. The first concern we 
address is that the data on vacant housing may be measured with error, because in 2011 the 
Census also included second homes. We therefore use another data source for 2001 and 2011 
from the Department of Communities and Local Government (DCLG - only available for a 
shorter time period). Because we do not have clear priors which data source provides a better 
estimate of ‘real’ vacancies in 2001, we calculate the average vacancy rate using both data 
sources for the year. We then estimate the same models as in Table 2. The second-stage 
results are reported in Table 4. Column (1) shows that even the bivariate specification 
suggests a positive and significant correlation between changes in regulatory restrictiveness 
and changes in vacancy rates. This also holds if we include local authority fixed effects in 
column (2) and control variables in column (3). In column (4), we instrument the change in 
major refusal rate with the change in share of Labour seats. The coefficient is almost identical 
to previous results: a one standard deviation increase in the major refusal rate increases the 
vacancy rate by 1.0 percentage points. This result is hardly affected if we include local 
authority fixed effects in column (5) and control variables in column (6). In column (7), we 
finally control flexibly for the change in local vote shares. In the last specification the 
coefficient on the change in the major refusal rate variable becomes slightly but not 
statistically significantly smaller. It is still statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Note 
that the first-stage estimates are identical to the ones presented in Table 3. The results seem 
highly reassuring and strongly indicate that the potential measurement error in the Census 
data is not influencing our results. 
In Table 5 we further test the robustness of our results to the potential measurement problem 
by excluding 2011 from the analysis. We report OLS and second stage results in Panel A. In 
columns (1) to (3), where we do not address endogeneity concerns, changes in the major 
refusal rate are positively associated with changes in the vacancy rate, although the effect is 
not statistically significant in column (3). In column (4), we instrument for the change in the 
major refusal rate. Again, the coefficient is strongly positive, but quite imprecisely estimated. 
The same holds for the remaining models; due to weak identification (see Panel B), the 
estimated effects are rather imprecisely estimated. Nevertheless, they seem to point towards a 
13 The correlation between the share Labour votes and the share Labour seats is 0.88. However, the correlation 
between the change in share Labour votes and the change in share Labour seats is much lower (ρ= 0.481). 
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 positive and economically meaningful effect of regulatory restrictiveness on vacancy rates, in 
line with the previous results. 
Recall that in our preferred specification (column (7) of Table 2), we included a fifth-order 
polynomial of changes in the share Labour votes in each LA. This is to isolate the impact of 
potentially unobserved demographic and socio-economic variables, which may be reflected 
in voting behaviour, from local political power. However, the choice of the order of 
polynomial is somewhat arbitrary. Table 6 investigates the robustness of the results to this 
choice. Panel A reports second-stage results, whereas Panel B reports the corresponding first-
stage results. In column (1) of Panel A we include only a linear term of change in the share 
Labour votes in local elections as a control. Changes in the share of Labour votes do not have 
a direct effect on changes in vacancy rates. The coefficient on the change in the major refusal 
rate variable is statistically significant at the 11 percent level. When we include a third or 
fourth order polynomial of change in share Labour votes, the coefficient on the change in the 
major refusal rate variable becomes slightly higher and statistically significant at the 10 
percent level. In column (5) we include a fifth-order polynomial of the change in local 
Labour vote shares, but we also include a fifth-order polynomial of the change in general 
election vote shares. The latter might be relevant, as one could argue that results of general 
elections might be a better proxy for the demographic characteristics of a local authority, due 
to the substantially higher turnouts; on the other hand re-working the Parliamentary 
Constituency vote shares to generate an estimate for LAs must induce some measurement 
error. The point estimate is very similar to the preferred specification, but the effect is only 
statistically significant at the 20 percent level, likely due to a weaker first-stage (the 
corresponding first-stage Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic is only 4.9). In Panel B, we report 
corresponding first-stage estimates. The instrument has a similar impact across different 
specifications, but becomes somewhat smaller in magnitude, once we allow for more 
flexibility in the vote share controls. 
In the baseline results we only treat changes in the major refusal rate as endogenous. It is 
possible to argue that changes in earnings are also subject to endogeneity concerns. Earnings, 
which are a proxy for local demand for housing, are also dependent on the reaction of labour 
supply to changes in demand. In turn, local labour supply depends on the flexibility and 
adaptability of the housing stock to accommodate new workers, and may therefore depend on 
the vacancy rate as well (Glaeser et al., 2006, Saks, 2008, Hilber and Vermeulen, 
forthcoming). We therefore use a labour demand shock measure based on employment by 
industry in 1971 as an instrument for earnings. The shock predicts the level of employment in 
each local authority using information on national employment growth in each industry. So, 
we use exogenous changes (from the local perspective) in employment growth to predict total 
employment in each local authority in each year. For example, this measure predicts a large 
drop in employment in areas that were specialised in mining in 1971. For a fuller discussion 
see Hilber and Vermeulen (forthcoming).  
Table 7 reports the results. Panel A reports second-stage results, while Panels B and C report 
the corresponding first-stage results. In column (1) of Panel A we only include the 
endogenous variables change in major refusal rate and change in earnings plus the year fixed 
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 effects. Changes in regulatory restrictiveness are still strongly positively correlated with 
changes in vacancy rates. The effect of changes in earnings is statistically insignificant, in 
line with previous results. Column (2) additionally includes LA fixed effects. The 
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic of 5.5 now indicates fairly weak identification. Since our model 
is just identified, the estimated instrumented coefficients are median unbiased, yet they may 
be too imprecisely estimated to be useful (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). However, because our 
model is just-identified, our results are median unbiased. Moreover, if our results are biased, 
they should be biased towards the corresponding OLS estimates (see columns (2) and (3) 
Table 2), which in our case would imply that the estimated coefficients are themselves 
underestimates (Stock and Yogo, 2005; Murray, 2006). In any case with these caveats in 
mind, column (2) indicates that changes in the regulatory restrictiveness have a positive and 
statistically significant impact on changes in vacancy rates. Although the coefficient on the 
change in earnings variable now becomes positive and is much larger in magnitude than in 
previous specifications, it is not statistically significantly different from zero. When we 
include further control variables in column (3), the results are hardly affected (and 
coefficients remain weakly identified). In the final – most rigorous – specification, reported 
in column (4), we also control flexibly for vote shares. Thus we identify our endogenous 
variables off of random variation in the number of Labour seats won beyond the share of 
Labour votes. The major refusal rate has a positive and statistically significant impact (at the 
five percent level) on vacancy rates: a one standard deviation increase in the major refusal 
rate increases the vacancy rate by 1.1 percentage points, very similar to that implied by the 
estimates reported in Table 2. 
In Panels B and Panel C we report the corresponding first-stage estimates of the models for 
the change in the major refusal rate and the change in earnings respectively. Changes in the 
share of Labour seats are a reasonably strong instrument for the change in the refusal rate. 
Changes in the labour demand shock measure are strongly positively correlated to changes in 
the refusal rate (i.e. areas that have experienced an exogenous inflow of employment have 
also become substantially more restrictive). In Panel C we observe that changes in the labour 
demand shock measure are also positively correlated to changes in earnings, as anticipated. 
In Web Appendix 2 we conduct a series of additional sensitivity analyses. We show that our 
results are robust to (i) excluding the Greater London area, (ii) using the refusal rate on all 
projects – not just major ones – and (iii) using a fixed effects, rather than a first-differencing 
approach. 
To conclude, the various robustness checks all deliver very similar estimated effects of 
restrictiveness on vacancy rates in terms of magnitude compared to the baseline models. This 
provides additional support for the proposition that increased regulatory restrictiveness causes 
higher vacancy rates. We note that the results are not always statistically strong in the more 
comprehensive specifications. This appears to be mainly due to weak(er) identification. 
3.5 What explains the increase in the vacancy rates with regulatory restrictiveness? 
In Section 2 we hypothesised that a positive relationship between restrictions and vacancy 
rates might be explained by increased mismatch. It is difficult to think of a good measure of 
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 mismatch. For reasons discussed in Section 2 we think that the ‘average commuting distance 
from the workplace’ provides a useful proxy measure. One of the most important 
characteristics of a house is its location with respect to jobs. It seems reasonable therefore 
that the average commuting distance from the workplace should capture mismatch in this 
dimension of housing characteristics for any given housing market. In principle, households 
have a preference to live close to their workplaces. If regulatory restrictions make it more 
difficult for people to find a home ‘matched’ to their preferences on other characteristics 
close to work, they have to search for properties further away. This adaptation of search 
behaviour implies, other things equal, vacancies will tend to be higher in the more restrictive 
LAs and lower in neighbouring less restrictive ones, as workers become more mismatched 
locationally. 
We gather data on the average commuting distance from the workplace for all the Census 
years. The data provide us with the share of people per commuting distance band (0-2km 2-
5km, etc.). We then calculate the average commuting distance by taking the midpoint of each 
category and weighting it by the number of persons in each category.  
Panel A in Table 8 reports the regression results of the log of average workplace commuting 
distance on the major refusal rate, where we follow the same approach as in Table 2. The 
results in the first column seem to suggest that commuting distance is not influenced by 
regulatory restrictiveness. When we include local authority fixed effects and demographic 
control variables, the results are still statistically insignificant. This is not too surprising as the 
refusal rate is highly endogenous and correlated to other factors that might explain 
commuting distances. For example, places that have become denser tend to have become 
more restrictive, but denser places also might have shorter commutes because jobs and 
households are located closer to each other.  
We therefore control for other factors that might be correlated with the refusal rate by 
instrumenting for the change in the refusal rate with the change in the share of labour seats 
(as in Table 2). The results in Panel A of Table 8, column (4) indicate a positive effect of 
local restrictiveness on commuting distance: a one standard deviation increase in the major 
refusal rate increases the commuting distance by 8.5 percent, a non-negligible effect. The 
effect becomes somewhat smaller (5.8 percent) when we include in column (5) local 
authority fixed effects. The effect continues to be essentially the same when we add further 
control variables in column (6) and a flexible function of the share of labour votes in column 
(7). In the last column, however, the effect is somewhat imprecisely estimated and only 
statistically significant at the 14 percent level.14 
As noted in Section 2 we also experimented with other measures of less direct proxies for 
mismatch. In Appendix 2 we report results for the share of non-permanent dwellings, Our 
underlying explanation for why this measure should proxy for housing market mismatch is 
that in more restrictive markets there is an incentive to accept even less optimally matched 
14 One may argue that earnings are endogenous, leading to biased results. However, if we instrument for 
earnings with a labour demand shock variable (as in Panel A of Table 7), the results are very similar. The point 
estimates related to the major refusal rate are around 7 percent, while the standard errors are even somewhat 
lower. 
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 housing characteristics in the short term in order to intensify and increase the efficiency of 
search. Living in temporary accommodation has a low switching cost associated with it and is 
a cheaper strategy than buying a suboptimal place to live and then reselling it when a more 
suitable house is found. The ease with which search can be undertaken and its effectiveness 
will increase if the house-hunter can be physically present in the local market (Ha and Hilber, 
2013). Moreover since the chances of finding a better match in the housing market will 
improve with length of time spent searching then there will be a payoff to having temporary 
accommodation available for searchers in markets where matching is more difficult. Thus in 
more restrictive LAs, other things equal, matching is more difficult and the share of 
temporary dwellings is greater. Although by improving the efficiency of search, temporary 
housing may itself reduce vacancies of permanent dwellings, it is such a relatively sub-
optimal form of housing we would expect house-hunters to resort to it only when there is 
extreme difficulty in matching their preferences to available housing supply. So we would 
expect that net the share of temporary housing would be positively correlated with local 
restrictiveness. As reported in Table A2 in Appendix 2 we find weak, but consistent, 
evidence that more restrictive markets will lead to a higher rate of non-permanent homes. 
Given that the rate of non-permanent homes is a somewhat noisy and indirect proxy for 
mismatch, it may not be too surprising that the results are not statistically highly significant. 
There may also be other empirical explanations for the positive relationship between 
restrictions and vacancy rates. In particular, one might expect that greater price volatility is 
associated with higher vacancy rates. This is because price volatility might create a (real) 
‘option to wait’ (McDonald and Siegel, 1986; Grenadier, 1995 and 1996). The greater the 
uncertainty (price volatility) the more valuable is a property owner’s option to delay selling 
and renting out the property. Thus, in times of greater uncertainty, owners will be more 
reluctant to sell or rent out their property. Especially in markets with lengthy leases – such as 
office markets – this can generate high and persistent (“sticky”) vacancy rates; landlords are 
better off keeping their units empty.  
We would expect however the real options argument to be less important in the British 
residential property markets compared to office markets since demand volatility tends to be 
lower (people have to live somewhere) and, for rentals, the lease length is typically quite 
short (a year or even less).  
The real options argument could be relevant since tight regulation (more inelastic supply) 
amplifies demand shocks, so we would expect price volatility to respond more strongly to 
demand volatility in places with tighter regulatory constraints. . The results reported in Panel 
B of Table 8 show that at least according to the instrumental variable specifications (columns 
4 to 7) the sensitivity of price volatility with respect to earnings volatility increases with 
regulatory restrictiveness. This provides some evidence that regulatory constraints potentially 
can increase vacancy rates by increasing price volatility. So the value of the real option to 
keep properties empty could in principle be an explanation for the positive relationship 
between regulatory restrictiveness and the local vacancy rate. 
In Appendix 2 we also estimate regressions where we directly control for commuting 
distance from the workplace and price volatility. In Table A3 we show that the coefficient on 
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 the refusal rate variable decreases by about 15 percent and ceases to be statistically 
significant at conventional levels once we control for commuting time (column 1). This 
suggests that at least a part of the positive effect of a change in regulatory restrictiveness on 
the chance in vacancy rates is driven by mismatch in the housing market as proxied by 
commuting time. When we instead control for price volatility (column 2), interestingly, the 
effect of the refusal rate on vacancy rates increases in magnitude and is statistically 
significant. This finding could be interpreted as suggesting that the real options argument 
does not play an important role in explaining the positive link between regulatory 
restrictiveness and vacancy rates. When we include both variables – commuting time and 
price volatility – in column (3), the coefficient on the instrumented refusal rate variable is 
again very similar to our base specification. When we finally additionally include the change 
in the share of non-permanent homes to our specification (column 4), the coefficient is again 
somewhat reduced providing some mild additional supportive evidence for the mismatch 
mechanism as driving force.  
We should note two caveats. First, our proxies, for mismatch in particular, are at best partial 
and, in the case particularly of the share of temporary homes, indirect, so we would not 
expect these variables to fully account for the positive impact of the (change in the) refusal 
rate on the (change in the) vacancy rate. Second, the findings reported in Table A3 should 
generally be interpreted with some caution. This is because both the commuting distance and 
the price volatility are likely endogenous, so the reported coefficients are likely biased. Still, 
overall, we interpret the findings from Table A3 as indicating that our key finding of a 
positive impact of local regulation on local vacancy rates is largely driven by the mismatch 
between the preferences of the local residents and the characteristics of the available local 
housing stock. This finding is certainly plausible in the context of the extraordinarily rigid 
British planning system. Whether similar effects can be observed in other countries is an 
interesting question.   
 
4. Conclusions 
This is the first attempt to rigorously analyse spatial and temporal variation in housing 
vacancy rates. It would come as no surprise to economists to observe that in well-functioning 
labour markets there was unemployment. Workers search for jobs and employers seek 
(better) qualified workers. Attempting to regulate unemployment away makes no sense. 
Vacant houses are equivalent to unemployed workers yet at least in Britain policy does try to 
‘regulate’ vacant homes away by using their existence to be more restrictive in the control of 
the supply of new homes and the structural adaptation of existing ones. 
In this paper we argue that such restrictions have two main opposing effects on housing 
vacancies. The ‘opportunity cost effect’ leads to a lower vacancy rate in the more restrictive 
housing markets because supply constraints lead to higher prices, and thus to higher 
opportunity costs of keeping housing vacant. The ‘mismatch effect’ will imply higher 
vacancy rates in the more restrictive housing markets because households will find it more 
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 difficult to match their preferences to the characteristics of the local housing supply given 
their budget constraints. So search becomes more prolonged and costly. 
We do indeed confirm that there is a simple negative correlation between local land use 
planning restrictiveness and local housing vacancies. This might appear to provide evidence 
to support the planners’ ‘common sense’ that the existence of empty houses means they can – 
even should - plan to be more restrictive in supply. This, however, appears to be the result of 
a form of joint causation. When we effectively control for unobserved and unobservable 
characteristics at the local level by using first differencing and add year fixed effects, to 
control for macroeconomic shocks, the negative correlation turns positive. When we further 
control for local linear trends, for other potential explanatory variables and account for the 
endogeneity of local regulatory restrictiveness, the causal effect of restrictiveness on vacancy 
rates is firmly positive in both a statistically significant and economically substantial manner.  
Our empirical analysis does not fully unpack the box of explanations. It is a reduced form 
telling us what the net impact of increased planning restrictiveness is on housing vacancies. If 
an LA becomes more restrictive, signalled by an increase in the rate of refusal of major 
residential development proposals, then all else equal vacancy rates increase in that LA. We 
also provide suggestive direct evidence that mismatch may be an important reason for higher 
vacancy rates in more restrictive housing markets, as commuting times to workplace in more 
restrictive LAs are longer. We subject our findings to an extensive sensitivity analysis. They 
survive remarkably unaltered. 
Welfare implications in markets with search frictions are not easy to derive. This is because 
households may search less or more than would be welfare optimal (Koster and Van 
Ommeren, 2015). However, if search levels are close to optimal, local regulatory constraints 
will likely lead to lower welfare levels via increasing local vacancy rates. This is because new 
homes are not built and existing homes are not renovated (adapted) to reflect the current 
preferences for housing characteristics in places with high demand. Moreover tight regulatory 
constraints also prevent conversion of existing non-residential property stock to housing in 
these places.  
It is the mismatch between the preferences of households and the housing stock on offer that 
leads, other things equal, to higher vacancy rates in the more regulated – typically more 
desirable – places. This is not to say that tighter regulatory constraints in some places 
necessarily increase vacancy rates at the aggregate level (for the whole country). However, 
even if on aggregate vacancy rates were unaffected by regulatory restrictiveness, regulatory 
constraints still likely cause a significant welfare loss. This is because too much housing stays 
empty in the most regulated, most desirable places with the strongest demand and highest 
valuations for living space (i.e., in the “wrong places”) and people are induced to commute 
further, itself an additional and net welfare loss.  
There are important implications for policy, particularly for the UK because of its 
extraordinarily restrictive planning system. Crucially planners should not allocate less land 
for development on the grounds that there are empty houses. Some vacancies are integral to 
the well-functioning of any market and, as our results show, trying to ‘regulate housing 
vacancies away’ is counterproductive. While using any stock of capital and land more 
 19 
 efficiently (having fewer vacant houses) is desirable in economic terms, achieving that 
requires not just an understanding of the causes of any inefficiency in the current pattern of 
use but policy tools to improve the efficiency of its use. As was remarked in the introduction 
the low cost airlines went about reducing vacant seats on the basis of a rational analysis of the 
causes of empty seats; urban policy seems to try to reduce housing vacancies on the basis of 
the Queen’s advice to Alice to ‘believe as many as six impossible things before breakfast’. It 
might be efficiency enhancing and welfare improving to implement policies to lower long 
term structural levels of vacancies – in the case of the UK perhaps by speeding up probate – 
but trying to regulate them away by clamping down on supply both paradoxically increases 
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Descriptive statistics (repeated cross-section) 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
     
Vacancy rate (in %) 3.886 1.340 0 12.06 
Major refusal rate, t-2 (in %) 27.43 14.63 0 78.57 
Male weekly earnings (in £) 545.7 147.3 258.3 1,793 
Share owner-occupied housing  0.669 0.112 0.0461 0.895 
Share council housing 0.161 0.113 0.00416 0.820 
Share age 30-65 0.449 0.0278 0.364 0.516 
Share age >65 0.164 0.0364 0.0613 0.314 
Share unemployed 0.0652 0.0296 0.0204 0.224 
Share highly educated 0.137 0.114 0.00244 0.536 
Share permanent illness 0.0348 0.0188 0.00745 0.122 
Predicted employment (‘labour demand shock’) †  57,913 47,674 9,832 474,473 
Share labour seats, t-2 0.309 0.269 0 0.992 
Share labour voters, local elections 0.315 0.168 0 0.770 
Share labour voters, general election 0.295 0.152 0.0243 0.753 
Mean commuting distance from workplace (in km) 6.853 3.465 2.141 18.66 
Coefficient of variation house prices, t+3 0.104 0.0745 0.00755 0.460 
Coefficient of variation earnings, t+3 0.0755 0.0400 0.00685 0.674 
Rate non-permanent homes (in %) 0.572 0.591 0.00670 5.862 
     
Notes: The number of observations is 1,400, as we have 4 observations for 350 local authorities. t-2 denotes that we 
include applications up to two years preceding and including the year of observation, t+4 denotes that we include data up 




 TABLE 2 
Baseline results – second stage  
(Dependent variable: Δ Vacancy rate) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Δ Major refusal rate, t-2  0.0434 0.101* 0.0801 0.820** 0.855** 0.840** 0.895* 
 (0.0382) (0.0532) (0.0501) (0.417) (0.405) (0.354) (0.530) 
Δ Earnings (log)   0.373   -0.0701 -0.125 
   (0.677)   (0.692) (0.719) 
Δ Share owner-occupied housing   -0.129   -0.262 -0.321 
   (0.356)   (0.369) (0.418) 
Δ Share council housing    0.736***   0.655*** 0.631*** 
   (0.235)   (0.219) (0.233) 
Δ Share age 30-65   -0.0989   0.0550 0.0754 
   (0.208)   (0.202) (0.211) 
Δ Share age >65   1.281***   1.432*** 1.362*** 
   (0.317)   (0.311) (0.319) 
Δ Share unemployed   0.368***   0.270** 0.276** 
   (0.138)   (0.114) (0.136) 
Δ Share highly educated   -0.493**   -0.581*** -0.617*** 
   (0.191)   (0.189) (0.214) 
Δ Share permanent illness   0.192**   0.151 0.123 
   (0.0972)   (0.0934) (0.0985) 
        
Δ Share labour voters local elections Ω( ∙ ) No No No No No No Yes 
Local authority fixed effects (350) No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Observations 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 
R-squared 0.373 0.488 0.559     
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic    18.52 17.49 19.01 8.151 
Notes: All independent variables (except for earnings) are standardised with mean zero and unit standard deviation. Bold indicates instrumented. In 
Models (4)-(7), the instrument for Δ Major refusal rate is Δ Share of labour seats in the local council. Ω( ∙ ) is approximated by a fifth-order 
polynomial of share labour voters in local elections. Standard errors are clustered at the LA level and in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.10.   
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 TABLE 3 
Baseline results – first stage  
(Dependent variable: Δ Major refusal rate, t-2) 
 (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Δ Share labour seats, t-2 -0.301*** -0.322*** -0.343*** -0.264** 
 (0.0700) (0.0943) (0.0966) (0.114) 
Δ Earnings (log)   0.579 0.504 
   (0.461) (0.468) 
Δ Share owner-occupied housing   0.250 0.318 
   (0.327) (0.323) 
Δ Share council housing   0.0880 0.113 
   (0.186) (0.188) 
Δ Share age 30-65   -0.194 -0.184 
   (0.150) (0.151) 
Δ Share age >65   -0.160 -0.148 
   (0.220) (0.218) 
Δ Share unemployed   0.112 0.134 
   (0.0880) (0.0874) 
Δ Share highly educated   0.167 0.189 
   (0.171) (0.175) 
Δ Share permanent illness   0.0828 0.0673 
   (0.0826) (0.0865) 
     
Δ Share labour voters local elections Ω�( ∙ ) No No No Yes 
Local authority fixed effects (350) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 
R-squared 0.168 0.310 0.324 0.331 
Notes: All independent variables (except for earnings) are standardised with mean zero and unit 
standard deviation. Ω�( ∙ ) is approximated by a fifth-order polynomial of share labour voters in 
local elections. Standard errors are clustered at the LA level and in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
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 TABLE 4 
Results using Census data (1981-2001) and DCLG data (2001-2011)  
(Dependent variable: Δ Vacancy rate) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Δ Major refusal rate, t-2  0.100*** 0.141*** 0.115** 0.961*** 1.040*** 0.917*** 0.780* 
 (0.0375) (0.0502) (0.0472) (0.350) (0.348) (0.308) (0.429) 
        
Control variables included (8) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Δ Share labour voters local elections Ω( ∙ ) No No No No No No Yes 
Local authority fixed effects (350) No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Observations 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 
R-squared 0.294 0.468 0.522     
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic    18.56 17.61 19.09 8.212 
        
Notes: All independent variables (except for earnings) are standardised with mean zero and unit standard deviation. Bold indicates instrumented. In 
Models (4)-(7), the instrument for Δ Major refusal rate is Δ Share of labour seats in the local council. Ω( ∙ ) is approximated by a fifth-order 





 TABLE 5 
Results using Census data (1981-2001, excluding 2011)  
PANEL A – Second stage (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
(Dependent variable: Δ Vacancy rate) OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Δ Major refusal rate, t-2  0.123** 0.191** 0.114 1.121 2.483* 2.321* 2.844 
 (0.0490) (0.0896) (0.0702) (0.697) (1.278) (1.401) (2.467) 
        
Control variables included (8) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Δ Share labour voters local elections Ω( ∙ ) No No No No No No Yes 
Local authority fixed effects (350) No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Observations 700 700 700 700 700 700 700 
R-squared 0.412 0.620 0.736     
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic    7.528 4.365 2.939 1.355 
        
PANEL B – First stage    (4) (5) (6) (7) 
(Dependent variable: Δ Major refusal rate, t-2)    OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Δ Share labour seats, t-2    -0.243*** -0.255 -0.219 -0.163 
    (0.0886) (0.173) (0.182) (0.200) 
        
Control variables included (8)    Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Δ Share labour voters local elections Ω( ∙ )    No No No Yes 
Local authority fixed effects (350)    No Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects    Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Observations    700 700 700 700 
R-squared    0.070 0.358 0.375 0.385 
Notes: All independent variables (except for earnings) are standardised with mean zero and unit standard deviation. Bold indicates instrumented. In 
Models (4)-(7), the instrument for Δ Major refusal rate is Δ Share of labour seats in the local council. Ω( ∙ ) is approximated by a fifth-order 





 TABLE 6 
Controlling for vote shares   
PANEL A – Second stage (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(Dependent variable: Δ Vacancy rate) 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Δ Major refusal rate, t-2  0.756 0.782 0.861* 0.897* 0.888 
 (0.473) (0.490) (0.505) (0.526) (0.689) 
Δ Share labour votes local elections -0.0742 2nd order 3rd order 4rd order 5th order 
 (0.158) polynomial polynomial polynomial polynomial 
Δ Share labour voters general elections      5th order polynomial 
      
Control variables included (8) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Local authority fixed effects (350) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Observations 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 9.213 8.896 8.680 8.285 4.917 
      
PANEL B – First stage (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(Dependent variable: Δ Major refusal rate, t-2) OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Δ Share labour seats, t-2 -0.274** -0.271** -0.273** -0.267** -0.215* 
 (0.111) (0.112) (0.114) (0.114) (0.119) 
Δ Share labour votes local elections -0.174* 2nd order 3rd order 4rd order 5th order 
 (0.101) polynomial polynomial polynomial polynomial 
Δ Share labour voters general elections      5th order 
polynomial 
      
Control variables included (8) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Local authority fixed effects (350) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Observations 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 
R-squared 0.329 0.329 0.329 0.331 0.338 
Notes: All independent variables (except for earnings) are standardised with mean zero and unit standard deviation. Bold 
indicates instrumented. The instrument for Δ Major refusal rate, t-2 is Δ Share labour seats, t-2. Standard errors are 
clustered at the LA level and in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
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 TABLE 7 
Instrumenting for regulatory restrictiveness and earnings 
PANEL A – Second stage 
(Dependent variable: Δ Vacancy rate) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Δ Major refusal rate, t-2  0.814** 0.966** 0.816* 1.055** 
 (0.390) (0.387) (0.439) (0.498) 
Δ Earnings (log) -0.257 4.469 6.370 4.149 
 (1.717) (5.170) (5.820) (5.114) 
     
Control variables included (8) No No Yes Yes 
Δ Share labour voters local elections Ω( ∙ ) No No No Yes 
Local authority fixed effects (350) No Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 9.660 5.467 3.714 3.610 
     
PANEL B – First stage 
(Dependent variable: Δ Major refusal rate, t-2) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Δ Share labour seats, t-2 -0.305*** -0.297*** -0.312*** -0.224* 
 (0.0702) (0.0957) (0.0981) (0.116) 
Δ Labour demand shock 1971 (log) 2.121*** 6.953** 10.29*** 10.12***  (0.666) (2.843) (3.102) (3.159) 
     
Control variables included (8) No No Yes Yes 
Δ Share labour voters local elections Ω( ∙ ) No No No Yes 
Local authority fixed effects (350) No Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 
R-squared 0.172 0.317 0.335 0.342 
Angrist-Pischke F-statistic 14.12 14.17 19.00 12.24 
     
PANEL C – First stage 
(Dependent variable: Δ Earnings (log)) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Δ Share labour seats, t-2 0.00575 0.0119 0.00259 0.0140 
 (0.00864) (0.0117) (0.0106) (0.0124) 
Δ Labour demand shock 1971 (log) 0.823*** 1.011*** 1.245*** 1.267***  (0.0809) (0.283) (0.326) (0.339) 
     
Control variables included (8) No No Yes Yes 
Δ Share labour voters local elections Ω( ∙ ) No No No Yes 
Local authority fixed effects (350) No Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 
R-squared 0.406 0.557 0.616 0.622 
Angrist-Pischke F-statistic 51.73 9.56 11.30 10.67 
Notes: Bold indicates instrumented. The instruments for Δ Major refusal rate and Δ Earnings (log) are Δ Share of 
labour seats and Δ Labour demand shock 1971 (log). Standard errors are clustered at the LA level and in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
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 TABLE 8 
Mismatch, real options and regulatory restrictiveness  
PANEL A – Second stage (Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
     Δ Commuting distance from workplace (log)) OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Δ Major refusal rate, t-2  -0.00274 0.00341 0.00106 0.0847*** 0.0584** 0.0594** 0.0608+ 
 (0.00283) (0.00400) (0.00384) (0.0321) (0.0296) (0.0274) (0.0407) 
        
Control variables included (8) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Δ Share labour voters local elections Ω( ∙ ) No No No No No No Yes 
Local authority fixed effects (350) No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Observations 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 
R-squared 0.883 0.913 0.922     
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic    18.52 17.49 19.01 8.151 
        
PANEL B – Second stage (Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
     Δ Coefficient of variation of house prices, t+3) OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Δ Major refusal rate, t-2 0.00499 -0.0493*** 0.00855 -0.0891* -0.119** -0.0726* -0.116* 
 (0.00453) (0.0126) (0.00659) (0.0479) (0.0605) (0.0434) (0.0679) 
Δ Major refusal rate, t-2 × Coefficient of variation  -0.0373 0.00700 -0.0757 0.802* 1.165** 0.692* 0.811* 
     of earnings, t+3 (0.0605) (0.155) (0.0858) (0.410) (0.570) (0.367) (0.468) 
        
Control variables included (8) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Δ Share labour voters local elections Ω( ∙ ) No No No No No No Yes 
Local authority fixed effects (350) No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Observations 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 
R-squared 0.332 0.153 0.527     
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic    18.52 17.49 19.01 8.151 
Notes: All independent variables (except for earnings) are standardised with mean zero and unit standard deviation. Bold indicates instrumented. In Models (4)-(7), instruments for 
Δ Major refusal rate and Δ Major refusal rate × Coefficient of variation of earnings are Δ Share of labour seats and Δ Share of labour seats × Coefficient of variation of earnings. 
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Housing supply restrictions across England 
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 APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1: Election data 
The local election data are obtained from three different sources. The first source is the British Local 
Election Database, which is compiled by Rallings and Thrasher (2004). They have combined 
different data sources on local election outcomes from 1889 to 2003. From 1973, the data contains 
the universe of local election outcomes. The data is available on a ward level and displays for every 
election the number of candidates, the number of votes per candidate and the number of vacant seats. 
Councillors that received the most votes will be elected. It is important to note that the share of votes 
for each party is therefore not perfectly correlated to the assigned number of seats. Based on the 
number of votes, we determine which candidate is elected as a councillor. The British Local Election 
Database only provides information on the election results, and not on the current composition of the 
local council. The problem is that for many local authorities, there are yearly or two-yearly elections 
of which 33 percent of the seats are replaced. To estimate the composition of the local council, we 
use the fact that the full electoral term for councillors is usually four years. However, sometimes 
elections replace the complete council despite the fact that councillors did not complete the electoral 
term, for example due to changes in boundaries of local authorities. To account for this, we consider 
full elections as elections where at least 75 percent of the seats are replaced.  
The second data source for local election results is the local election handbooks from 1999 to 2008 
(see Hilber et al., 2011). These data, also used in provide the number of council seats for each local 
authority in each year. We measure the correlation of the shares of seats of different parties (Labour, 
Conservatives, Liberal Democrats, Other) between the British Local Election Database and the latter 
database for the overlapping years. This is always above 0.95. For the overlapping years, we take the 
average of shares in seats in both datasets. For 2006-2011, we obtain information on Labour votes 
(rather than seats) from the Local Elections Archive Project (LEAP). For 55 local authorities, we do 
not have information available for the most recent election in 2011. We then use information on 
Labour vote shares for the 2007 elections. We made sure that excluding these 55 local authorities 
lead to essentially the same results. The final dataset is from the BBC with the outcomes of local 
council elections for 2009, 2010 and 2011 to complement the LEAP when necessary. 
We also use outcomes of general elections to control for demographic changes and general trends in 
political preferences. We have data of election results for 1983, 1987, 1991, 1997, 2001, 2005 and 
2010 obtained from Electoral Calculus. We match each year to the previous election, except for 
1981, which is matched to 1983. The results are available at the parliamentary constituency level, 
which are almost always smaller than local authorities. Using geographical information systems, we 
calculate the geographical overlap of each constituency with each local authority and assign the votes 
accordingly. 
Table A1 below shows some correlation for the election variables of the Labour party. It is shown 
that the correlation between the share of Labour council seats and the share of Labour votes is high 
(0.87). The correlation with general election vote share is somewhat lower, but still reasonable high 




 TABLE A1 
Correlations between election variables 





votes gen. elec. 
    
Share labour seats, t-2 1.0000   
Share labour votes 0.8761 1.0000  
Share labour votes general elections 0.6901 0.6060 1.0000 
    
 Δ Share labour 
seats 
Δ Share labour 
votes 
Δ Share labour 
votes gen. elec. 
    
Δ Share labour seats, t-2 1.0000   
Δ Share labour votes 0.5706 1.0000  
Δ Share labour votes general elections 0.4474 0.3834 1.0000 
    
 
 
APPENDIX 2: Mismatch and restrictiveness  
 
Measures of mismatch in the local housing stock are not easy to devise. Moreover any relationship 
between such a measure – however valid it might be – and the restrictiveness with which planning 
policy is applied locally could be subject to a number of different factors and endogeneity is an issue. 
In the core analysis of our paper we proposed ‘commuting distance from the workplace’ as a 
plausible proxy for the level of mismatch in the housing market. In this appendix we derive an 
additional (or alternative) indicator: the proportion of the local stock of dwellings which are not 
permanent (caravans, mobile homes, etc.).  
One would unambiguously expect the share of such non-permanent dwellings to increase with search 
costs in the local housing market since the ease with which search can be undertaken will increase if 
the house-hunter can be physically present in the local market (Ha and Hilber, 2013). Moreover since 
the chances of finding a better match in the housing market will improve with length of time spent 
searching then there will be a payoff to having temporary accommodation available for searchers in 
markets where matching is more difficult. (Note also that non-permanent homes are not included 
when calculating the vacancy rate, which is only based on permanent homes.) However since the 
attraction of temporary homes is that they give cheap access (transactions costs are low compared to 
buying and then selling houses that do not match the individuals’ preferences) to search and so 
improve its efficiency it is possible that more temporary homes in a more restricted local market may 
reduce vacancies ceteris paribus. In this sense more temporary homes is likely an indicator of more 
mismatch rather than a measure. 
Figure A1 provides some evidence in support of this proposition. It plots the mean share of non-
permanent dwellings (caravans, mobile homes, etc.) over the period 1981-2011 against the major 
refusal rate in the LA over the same period. There is a strong and positive correlation between these 
two variables (ρ = 0.425).   
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 FIGURE A1 
Non-permanent dwellings and regulatory restrictiveness 
 
 
We also estimate regressions where we use first-differencing and regress the rate of non-permanent 
dwellings on the major refusal rate. Table A2 below reports the results of these additional 
regressions, where we follow the same approach as in Table 2. In column (1) we regress the change 
in the share of non-permanent dwellings on just the change in major refusal rate. It appears that there 
is no statistically significant impact of restrictions on the share of non-permanent dwellings. Also if 
we include local authority fixed effects and demographic controls, the results are statistically 
insignificant.  
However, developers may be less likely to apply at all when there is a high probability that their 
application will be turned down. This may lead to a bias towards zero of the estimated coefficients. In 
column (4) we aim to account for the measurement error in the refusal rate: we instrument with the 
share of Labour seats (as in the rest of the paper). Note that the first-stage results are identical to the 
ones presented in Table 3. The results in column (4) reveal that the impact of regulatory 
restrictiveness on the rate of non-permanent dwellings becomes substantially stronger: one standard 
deviation increase in the major refusal rate leads to an increase in the rate of non-permanent 
dwellings of 0.09 percentage points (about one-fifth of a standard deviation). Hence, measurement 
error seems to be important here. However, the result is still not statistically significantly different 
from zero (p-value = 0.219). In column (5) we further include local authority fixed effects. The point 
estimate is very similar to the previous specification and statistically significantly different from zero 
at the 16 percent level (p-value = 0.158). Hence, the estimate is quite imprecisely estimated. This is 
not too surprising given that the share of non-permanent home is quite noisy. For example, the 
proportion of temporary homes is very small in the great majority of LAs but in tourist areas it is 































Average major refusal rate 1981-2011 
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 In column (6) we include demographic control variables. This produces a similar point estimate but is 
also statistically significant at the 20 percent level (p-value = 0.151). In the final column, we control 
for a flexible function of the share of labour votes in a local authority. The coefficient then becomes 
somewhat stronger: one standard deviation increase in the major refusal rate leads to an increase in 
the rate of non-permanent dwellings of 0.18 percentage points. The result is then close to being 
statistically significant at the 10% level (p-value = 0.114). 
Although these regressions do not provide conclusive evidence, the positive relationship between the 
share of non-permanent dwellings and local restrictiveness does seem to provide some circumstantial 
evidence. The positive relationship is certainly consistent with the proposition that more restrictive 
local planning increases the costs of matching would-be house buyers in the local housing market to 
the available permanent housing, inducing people to live temporarily in caravans and mobile homes – 
clearly inferior substitutes to houses. 
Finally, we include commuting distance and price volatility as additional controls in the regression of 
vacancy rates on the major refusal rate. Table A3 reports the results, where column (7) in Table 2 is 
the corresponding specification. In column (1) of Table A3 we show that commuting distance is 
positively associated with higher vacancy rates. A one kilometre increase in the average commuting 
distance is associated with an increase in the vacancy rate of about 2 percentage points. We do not 
interpret this as a strictly causal effect, but the sign is in line with our expectations. The effect of 
restrictiveness is about 15 percent lower compared to the baseline specification. The effect is now 
statistically significantly different from zero only at the 13 percent level (p-value = 0.131). 
Commuting distance is a crude proxy for mismatch in the housing market, which may explain why 
the effect of interest is only somewhat smaller. In column (2) we include the coefficient of variation 
of prices in the year of observation and the three years subsequent to the year of observation. The 
coefficient is positive and highly statistically significant. Interestingly, the coefficient on regulatory 
restrictiveness is now somewhat higher compared to the baseline specification. Column (3) includes 
both commuting distance and price volatility, leading to similar conclusions. Column (4) also 
includes the (change in the) share of non-permanent homes. The coefficient on non-permanent homes 
is positive, in line with expectations but is not statistically significantly different from zero at 
conventional significance levels. Including the (change in the) share of non-permanent homes 
reduces the coefficient on the regulatory restrictiveness variable somewhat, in line with the 
proposition that the positive causal effect from regulatory restrictiveness on housing vacancies is 
driven by mismatch between contemporaneous household preferences and the stock of housing 






Additional evidence for mismatch in the housing market  
(Dependent variable: Δ Rate non-permanent homes) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS  
Δ Major refusal rate, t-2  0.00473 0.00346 0.00525 0.0902 0.107+ 0.104+ 0.181+ 0.207+ 
 (0.0106) (0.0135) (0.0129) (0.0734) (0.0761) (0.0721) (0.114) (0.129) 
Δ House prices (log)        0.226* 
        (0.120) 
         
Control variables included (8) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Δ Share labour voters local elections Ω( ∙ ) No No No No No No Yes Yes 
Local authority fixed effects (350) No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Observations 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 
R-squared 0.034 0.327 0.362      
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic    18.52 17.49 19.01 8.151 6.681 
         
Notes: All independent variables (except for earnings) are standardised with mean zero and unit standard deviation. Bold indicates instrumented. In Models (4)-
(7), the instrument for Δ Major refusal rate is Δ Share of labour seats in the local council. Ω( ∙ ) is approximated by a fifth-order polynomial of share labour 





Results controlling for commuting time and earnings volatility 
(Dependent variable: Δ Vacancy rate) 
PANEL A – Second stage 
(Dependent variable: Δ Vacancy rate) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Δ Major refusal rate, t-2  0.775+ 1.051** 0.937* 0.870* 
 (0.513) (0.517) (0.497) (0.492) 
Δ Commuting distance from workplace (log) 1.977***  2.095*** 2.021*** 
 (0.660)  (0.670) (0.678) 
Δ Coefficient of variation of house prices, t+3  2.970** 3.225*** 3.502*** 
  (1.172) (1.107) (1.093) 
Δ Share non-permanent homes    0.478 
    (0.317) 
     
Control variables included (8) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Δ Share labour voters local elections Ω( ∙ ) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Local authority fixed effects (350) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 8.307 9.049 9.192 8.078 
     
PANEL B – First stage 
(Dependent variable: Δ Major refusal rate, t-2) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Δ Share labour seats, t-2 -0.283** -0.275** -0.293** -0.290** 
 (0.114) (0.115) (0.114) (0.114) 
Δ Commuting distance from workplace (log) -0.329  -0.438 -0.441 
 (0.315)  (0.326) (0.327) 
Δ Coefficient of variation of house prices, t+3  0.165 0.589 0.632 
  (0.783) (0.811) (0.816) 
Δ Share non-permanent homes    0.0825 
    (0.186) 
     
Control variables included (8) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Δ Share labour voters local elections Ω( ∙ ) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Local authority fixed effects (350) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 
R-squared 0.327 0.326 0.328 0.328 
Notes: Bold indicates instrumented. The instrument for Δ Major refusal rate is Δ Share of labour seats. 




 WEB APPENDICES  
WEB APPENDIX 1: Theoretical model 
W1.1 Matching and sales time 
We analyse a country with search frictions where households may move, but not freely, between 
housing markets. We extend the seminal house price bargaining model by Wheaton (1990), which can 
be interpreted as a model with two symmetric housing markets. We follow Koster and Van Ommeren 
(2015) by relaxing the symmetry assumption. This is needed to analyse the effects of more stringent 
land use regulations in one of the two housing markets. We first outline the model and discuss the 
relationship between search effort, matching rates, house prices and regulatory restrictiveness. Using 
numerical simulations, we then illustrate that regulatory restrictions may both increase or decrease the 
(relative) vacancy rate, while they will lead to relatively higher prices and lower matching rates. 
Assume a country with a given number of home-owning households equal to 2𝐻𝐻�. The country consists 
of two local housing markets each with 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 identical housing units, where 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2. Households own at 
least one house but may own two houses. All houses, including vacant ones, are owned by a household 
implying that (𝑆𝑆̅ − 𝐻𝐻�) 𝐻𝐻�⁄ < 0.5. Households prefer to live in one of the two housing markets. Let 
𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖 denote the number of households who prefer to live in housing market 𝑖𝑖, where 𝑖𝑖 = 1, 2. Households 
who live in their preferred housing market are matched, otherwise they are mismatched. Mismatched 
households search for housing in the other housing market. Dual-ownership households have a house in 
both housing markets, are therefore matched, but own a vacant house in the other housing market. 
Preferences for a housing market change over time at an exogenous rate 𝛽𝛽. For example, the location of 
the job may be exogenously changed from one neighbourhood to the other due to a firm relocation 
(Mulalich et al., forthcoming). The change over time in 𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖 denoted by ?̇?𝐻𝑖𝑖 =  𝛽𝛽�𝐻𝐻𝑗𝑗 − 𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖� for 𝑖𝑖 ≠ 𝑗𝑗. In 
what follows, 𝑗𝑗 will always denote the other housing market. The total endogenously determined 
number of households that have a preference to reside in 𝑖𝑖 is given by 𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖  =  𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀  + 𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷  +  𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆, where  𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀 is the number of matched households with one house, 𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷 is the number of households possessing 
two houses, and 𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆 denotes the number of mismatched households. 
By construction, the vacancy rate in a housing market 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖  equals housing supply 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 minus the number of 
households living there divided by the number of housing units in 𝑖𝑖. Because mismatched households 𝑗𝑗 
live in housing market 𝑖𝑖, the following holds: 
(1) 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 = 𝐻𝐻𝑗𝑗𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 = 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 − 𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷 − 𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀 − 𝐻𝐻𝑗𝑗𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 . 
Each vacant house is owned by a household that lives in the other housing market, so 𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷 = 𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 where 
𝑖𝑖 ≠ 𝑗𝑗. Hence, the number of vacant housing units in housing market j is equal to the number of dual-
ownership households living in housing market i. Mismatched households search for houses in the other 
housing market and given a contact with a vacancy in that housing market, they find a (suitable) house 
with probability one. Matching of mismatched households and vacant houses, and therefore the sales of 
vacant residences, occur with a Poisson process. The sales rate 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖  equals the product of the number of 
mismatched households of type 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖, the matching rate of a mismatched household 𝑖𝑖, divided by the 
number of vacancies in housing market i: 
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 (2) 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖  =  𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 = 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 , 
where 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 = 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆⁄ , so the ratio of vacancies to mismatched households. The sales time is then defined 
as ℓ𝑖𝑖 = 1 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖⁄ . Given the above assumptions, following Wheaton (1990), the first-order differential 
equations that indicate how households change type and move between housing markets are given by: 
(3) ?̇?𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆 = −(𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽)𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽𝛽𝐻𝐻𝑗𝑗𝑀𝑀, 
(4) ?̇?𝐻𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷 = −�𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗 + 𝛽𝛽�𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷 + 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽𝛽𝐻𝐻𝑗𝑗𝐷𝐷 , 
(5) ?̇?𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀 = −?̇?𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆 − ?̇?𝐻𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷,       𝑖𝑖 ≠ 𝑗𝑗 
The above equations provide a stable model of changes in household type and moving.  
W1.2 Steady state and regulatory restrictions 
We will now assume that the market is in steady-state. Hence, ?̇?𝐻𝑖𝑖 = ?̇?𝐻𝑗𝑗 = 0, and 𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖 = 𝐻𝐻𝑗𝑗 = 𝐻𝐻�.15 We 
keep the total number of housing units in the housing market fixed and equal to 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇 = 2𝐻𝐻� (1 − 𝑛𝑛)⁄ , 
where 𝑛𝑛 may be interpreted as the natural vacancy rate.16 We then define: 
(6) 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 = 1 − 𝜌𝜌1 − 𝑛𝑛𝐻𝐻�        and        𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 = 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇 − 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖, 
where 𝜌𝜌 indicates the degree of restrictiveness. When 𝜌𝜌 = 0, the number of housing units in both 
housing markets is the same. Conditional on the matching rates 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 and 𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗 (to be determined in the next 
subsection), we can obtain explicit expressions for the number of households of each type. It can be 
shown that: 
(7) 𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆 = 𝛽𝛽(1 − 2𝑛𝑛 + 𝜌𝜌)(1 − 𝑛𝑛)(2𝛽𝛽 + 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖)𝐻𝐻�        and        𝐻𝐻𝑗𝑗𝑆𝑆 = 𝛽𝛽(1 − 2𝑛𝑛 − 𝜌𝜌)(1 − 𝑛𝑛)�2𝛽𝛽 + 𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗�𝐻𝐻�. 
Given the latter equality, we obtain the intuitive result that the number of mismatched households in 𝑖𝑖 
depends negatively on the matching rate 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 (but does not depend on the matching rate of the other 
housing market 𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗).17 It is also observed that the matching rate in 𝑖𝑖 depends positively on regulatory 
restrictiveness, while the number of mismatched households in 𝑗𝑗 decreases when 𝜌𝜌 is higher. We may 
also interpret this as an indirect way of commuting distance. If 𝛽𝛽 signals the workplace, a higher 𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆 will 
imply a longer workplace commute distance from 𝑖𝑖 because mismatched households of type 𝑖𝑖 still live 
in 𝑗𝑗. 
Similarly, the number of matched households in i can be written as: 
15 In addition, the number of households who move residence from one housing market into the other is equal to the number 
of households who move the other way round, so 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆 =  𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗𝐻𝐻𝑗𝑗𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽𝛽�𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷 − 𝐻𝐻𝑗𝑗𝐷𝐷�, where the last term denotes the net 
number of dual-ownership households who move from 𝑖𝑖 to 𝑗𝑗, because they have changed preference while holding two 
houses. 
16 One may endogenise housing supply and therefore 𝑛𝑛 as a function of house prices. We discuss this issue later. 
17 In line with intuition, when 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 approaches infinity, so search frictions in i are absent, the number of mismatched 
households of type 𝑖𝑖 (who live in j) approaches zero. 
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 (8) 𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀 = (1 − 2𝑛𝑛 − 𝜌𝜌)�𝛽𝛽 + 𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗�(1 − 𝑛𝑛)�2𝛽𝛽 + 𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗� 𝐻𝐻�        and        𝐻𝐻𝑗𝑗𝑀𝑀 = (1 − 2𝑛𝑛 + 𝜌𝜌)(𝛽𝛽 + 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖)(1 − 𝑛𝑛)(2𝛽𝛽 + 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖) 𝐻𝐻� 
which is an increasing function of the matching rate in the other housing market, but does not depend on 
the own matching rate. From (8), it can be immediately seen that restrictions reduce the number of 
matched households in 𝑖𝑖. 
The vacancy rate 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 is equal to the number of dual owners in housing market 𝑗𝑗 divided by the housing 
supply in 𝑖𝑖. Using (1), (6), (7) and (8): 
(9) 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽 �(𝜌𝜌 − 1)𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗 − 4𝑛𝑛𝛽𝛽� + 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 �(1 − 4𝑛𝑛 + 𝜌𝜌)𝛽𝛽 − (𝑛𝑛 − 𝜌𝜌)𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗�(𝜌𝜌 − 1)(2𝛽𝛽 + 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖)�2𝛽𝛽 + 𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗� , 
It is more informative to evaluate the derivative of the vacancy rate with respect to restrictions: 
 
PROPOSITION 1 [Vacancy rate effect of restrictions]: Restrictions may either positively or negatively 
affect vacancy rates, d𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 d𝜌𝜌⁄ ⋚ 0. 
 
Proof. The derivative of (9) is given by: 
(10) 𝜕𝜕𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝜌𝜌
= (𝑛𝑛 − 1)𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖2𝛽𝛽 + 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 + 2𝑛𝑛𝛽𝛽2𝛽𝛽 + 𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗(𝜌𝜌 − 1)2 , 
The denominator is always positive. In the presence of regulations, the vacancy rate will increase when 
the natural vacancy rate is high relative to the matching rates 𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗. Also when 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 → 0 (but 𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗 is not close 
to zero), (10) becomes positive, so in inefficient markets with low matching rates, restrictions may lead 
to increases in vacancy rates. ∎ 
W1.3 Matching and house prices 
In the previous subsection, matching rates were given. We will now assume that matching rates are 
endogenously determined. Mismatched households choose the level of search effort 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 to find a new 
house. We assume a constant return to scale Cobb-Douglas matching function, following the theoretical 
and empirical literature on labour market matching: 
(11) 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 = 𝜇𝜇𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝜓𝜓𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖1−𝜓𝜓, 
where 𝜇𝜇 is a constant. Note again that 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 = 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆⁄ .  
The level of search effort is based on the households’ present discounted value of being in a certain 
state, which depends, among others, on house prices. In steady state, the value of a certain state can be 
written as the utility flow of being in that state plus the value of changing state: 
(12) 𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀  =  𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽�𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗𝑆𝑆 − 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀�, 
(13) 𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷  = 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗�𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀 − 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷 + 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗� + 𝛽𝛽�𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗𝐷𝐷 − 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷� , 
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 (14) 𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆  = −𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽�𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗𝑀𝑀 − 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆� + 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖�𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷 − 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆 − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖�,      𝑖𝑖 ≠ 𝑗𝑗  
where 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀, 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷, 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆 are the present values of each state (matched, dual ownership, mismatched), 
𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 refers to the utility flow of the housing market-specific amenity, 𝑟𝑟 is the discount rate, 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 is 
the cost of search and 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 is the house price. Matched and dual-owners households of type 𝑖𝑖 enjoy 
the housing market-specific amenity 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 , see (12) and (13), whereas mismatched households of 
type 𝑖𝑖 (who live in 𝑗𝑗) do not enjoy 𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗.18 Households are assumed to choose the level of search 
effort 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 to maximise 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆.  
In equation (14), it is assumed that mismatched households incur search costs 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 as a function of search 
effort. We will assume that 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 = 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖2 2⁄ , so 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 is an increasing and convex function of search effort.19 
Here, we only consider symmetric equilibria where all households choose the same search effort level. 
The individual matching rate of a mismatched household of type i is the product of individual search 
effort and the average number of matches in the point where ?̃?𝑒𝑖𝑖 = 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖, where ?̃?𝑒𝑖𝑖 is the individual level of 







The marginal cost from an additional unit of search effort is equal to the marginal benefit of that 








𝑆𝑆 − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖� , 
where 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷 − 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆 − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 indicates the benefit of a match for mismatched households. 
In a general equilibrium setting, prices are endogenous. We assume that buyers and sellers bargain about 
prices using Nash-bargaining, where buyers get a fixed share 𝜎𝜎 of the total benefits of the match. So, 
𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖
𝐷𝐷 − 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖
𝑆𝑆 − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 = 𝜎𝜎�𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷 − 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆 + 𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗𝑀𝑀 − 𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗𝐷𝐷� and hence 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 = 𝜎𝜎�𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗𝐷𝐷 − 𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗𝑀𝑀� + (1 − 𝜎𝜎)�𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷 − 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆�. 
W1.4 Numerical simulations 
In this subsection we show that under reasonable parameter values, vacancy rates may be positively 
associated with regulatory restrictiveness. We assume that 2𝐻𝐻� = 1900, 𝛽𝛽 = 𝑛𝑛 = 0.15, 𝜌𝜌 = 0.1. We 
furthermore assume that sellers and buyers have equal bargaining power (𝜎𝜎 = 0.5) and the interest rate 
is 2.5 percent (𝑟𝑟 = 0.025). The amenity 𝐴𝐴 level is set to 10 in both housing markets. We analyse the 
outcomes when the market is in steady state.  The model is solved using an iterative two-step 
procedure.21 In Figure W1 we plot the matching rates in 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗 as a function of the matching constant 𝜇𝜇. 
Given the first order condition of (16), when 𝜇𝜇 increases search effort will be higher and matching rates 
18 If one assumes that mismatched households receive a positive share of 𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗, results will not change. 
19 We may also assume that dual ownership households incur search costs. However, because we will allow for bargaining on 
the price later on, this will not change the outcomes of the model, while it unnecessarily complicates matters. 
20 This means that the second-order derivative of the matching rate with respect to individual search effort is equal to zero. 21 First, conditional on an initial (arbitrary) choice of values for number of household variables 𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆 , 𝐻𝐻𝑗𝑗𝑆𝑆 , 𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀  and 𝐻𝐻𝑗𝑗𝑀𝑀 , we solve for house prices, optimal search effort in both areas. Given optimal search effort, we determine 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 , 𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗 , 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖  and 
𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗 . Given these values, we calculate the number of households in each state using equations (3) to (5). We continue this process until the model converges. 
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 are higher because it is more costly to leave a property vacant essentially. It is shown that the matching 
rate in 𝑖𝑖 is always lower than in 𝑗𝑗 given restrictions in 𝑖𝑖 (the refusal rate is set to 0.1). Figure W2 shows 
that vacancy rates in 𝑖𝑖 are only higher than in 𝑗𝑗 when the matching constant is smaller. That is, when the 
opportunity costs of leaving a property empty are not too high. Figure W3 confirms the empirical 
stylised fact that prices in restrictive local housing markets are above the house prices of less restrictive 
housing markets. We note that one may also endogenise housing supply as a function of prices. This 
would mean that, conditional on supply restrictions, supply would increase in the more restrictive 
housing market 𝑖𝑖. This means that the vacancy rate in 𝑖𝑖 would increase even more, amplifying the 
positive effect of restrictions on vacancy rates. 
 
FIGURE W1 
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 FIGURE W2 
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 WEB APPENDIX 2: Additional robustness checks 
In this web appendix we consider additional sensitivity analyses. The results are reported in Table W1. 
First, we exclude the Greater London area to test whether the results are driven by the restrictive 
metropolitan area of London. Column (1) in Table W1 shows that the coefficient related to restrictions 
is even somewhat stronger compared to the baseline specification in column (7), Table 2. Hence, our 
results are not driven by the Greater London area. In column (2), Table W1, we focus on all restrictions 
as a sensitivity check. Because minor applications are much less important than major applications; the 
latter referring to the construction of at least 10 dwellings, while the first may refer to an application to 
construct an attic. We therefore, somewhat arbitrarily, first calculate the major and minor refusal rate 
and then take the average to arrive at the total refusal rate. The results indicate that the coefficient 
related to the total refusal rate is somewhat higher, albeit similar to the baseline specification. Because 
the minor refusal rate is much noisier than the major refusal rate, the Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic is 
much lower than in the baseline specification. This translates into somewhat less precise second-stage 
estimates, although the effect is still statistically significantly different from zero at the ten percent level. 
Finally, we pursue a fixed effects approach, rather than first-differencing. In column (5) we regress the 
vacancy rate on the major refusal rate, while controlling for demographic variables, all in levels. We 
also include LA fixed effects. The results indicate then that a one standard deviation increase in the 
refusal rate leads to an increase in the vacancy rate of 0.76 percentage points, which is similar to the 
baseline specification. In column (6) we include 354 local authority-specific linear trends. Results are 
essentially unchanged.. Column (7) includes non-linear trends by estimating second-order polynomials. 
The effect almost doubles to 1.82, but that may be due to weaker identification (the Kleibergen-Paap F-
statistic is relatively low with 5.08). Nevertheless, this suggests that controlling more carefully for 




 TABLE W1 
Additional sensitivity checks – second stage results 
















      2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Δ Major refusal rate, t-2  1.218**     
 (0.511)     
Δ Total refusal rate, t-2  1.124*    
  (0.673)    
Major refusal rate, t-2   0.757** 0.714** 1.822*** 
   (0.346) (0.294) (0.690) 
      
Control variables included (8) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Δ Share labour voters local elections Ω( ∙ ) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Share labour voters local elections Ω( ∙ ) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Local authority fixed effects (350) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Local authority-specific linear trends (350) No No No Yes Yes 
Local authority-specific non-linear trends (350) No No No No Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Observations 954 1,050 1,400 1,400 1,400 
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 9.608 2.962 17.52 16.63 5.081 
Notes: All independent variables (except for earnings) are standardised with mean zero and unit standard 
deviation. Bold indicates instrumented. The instrument for (Δ) Major refusal rate is (Δ) Share of labour 
seats in the local council. Ω( ∙ ) is approximated by a fifth-order polynomial of share labour voters. 
Standard errors are clustered at the LA level and in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, + p<0.20. 
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